Abstract. It is shown that the n-player lottery contest admits a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000, Economics Letters). This is true also when the contest technology re ‡ects the possibility of a draw. The result implies, in particular, the existence of a nontrivial two-player zero-sum game that is best-response equivalent to a game with identical payo¤ functions.
Introduction
Potential games are interesting because they allow conclusions not only regarding existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, but also regarding the outcome of dynamic and boundedly rational adjustment processes. Since Monderer and Shapley's (1996) seminal contribution, the literature has produced increasingly ‡exible variants of the initial concepts. One such generalization has led to the notion of a best-response potential (Voorneveld, 2000; Kukushkin, 2004; Dubey et al., 2006; Uno, 2007 Uno, , 2011 Park, 2015) . According to the de…nition, a game with continuous strategy spaces admits a best-response potential if there is a game with identical payo¤ functions that is best-response equivalent (henceforth BRequivalent, etc.) to the original game, i.e., that has the same BR-correspondence, mapping any pro…le of pure strategies to a set of pure strategy pro…les, as the original game. This paper has two parts. In the …rst, we show that the n-player lottery contest admits a BR-potential. This holds true regardless of whether the contest allocates the prize with probability one (Haavelmo, 1954; Tullock, 1975; Bell et al., 1975; Baron, 1994) or there is a probability of a draw (Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Blavatskyy, 2010; Jia, 2012) . 1 In the second part of the paper, we exploit the strategic equivalence between contests and zero-sum games, 2 so as to derive potentially interesting implications of our result. In particular, it is shown that a non-trivial two-player zero-sum game may be BR-equivalent to a game with identical payo¤ functions.
The lottery contest and its natural generalizations have found widespread application in economics and political theory (Konrad, 2009) . It corresponds to a Cournot game with isoelastic inverse demand and constant marginal costs. Deschamps (1975) proved convergence of …ctitious play in a two-player Cournot oligopoly with strictly declining BR-functions. Thorlund-Peterson (1990) extended this result to an arbitrary number of …rms. An exact potential exists for the Cournot game with linear demand (Slade, 1994) . More generally, su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a BR-potential have been found for aggregative games that allow monotone BR-selections (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010) .
However, all these methods do not apply to the lottery contest whose BR-function is not 1 Like this paper, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) allow for both cases. 2 By strategic equivalence, we mean vNM-equivalence (Morris and Ui, 2004) , i.e., for each player, the payo¤ function in one game is equal to a positive constant times the payo¤ function in the other game, plus a term that depends only on the opponents'strategies. The strategic equivalence between contests and zero-sum games is implicit in Moulin and Vial (1978) . Applications include Pavlov (2013) , Ewerhart and Valkanova (2016) , and Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017) . monotone (Dixit, 1987) . Also more recent examples of BR-potential games (Dragone et al., 2012; Bourlès et al., 2015) do not cover the case of the lottery contest.
The lottery contest admits a BR-potential
In the lottery contest G a , with noise parameter a 0, common valuation V > 0, and n 2 players, each player i 2 f1; :::; ng simultaneously and independently chooses an e¤ort x i 0, and subsequently receives a payo¤ of u a i (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = 8 > < > :
where x = x 1 + ::: + x n denotes aggregate e¤ort. The game G a is known to possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that is necessarily symmetric (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998) . 3 An n-person game G = (X 1 ; :::; X n ; u 1 ; :::; u n ) with strategy spaces X i and payo¤ functions u i : X X 1 ::: X n ! R for players i = 1; :::; n is called a BR-potential game (Voorneveld, 2000) if there exists a function P : X ! R such that arg max
for any i = 1; :::; n and any x i = (x 1 ; :::; x i 1 ; x i+1 ; :::; x n ) 2 X i X 1 ::: X i 1 X i+1
::: X n .
The following observation has, to the author's knowledge, not been documented in the literature. 4 Proposition 1. For any a 0, the n-player lottery contest is a BR-potential game.
Proof. Consider …rst the case a > 0. We claim that, in this case,
is a BR-potential for G a . Indeed, di¤erentiating (3), we …nd
3 For a = 0, Dasgupta and Nti (1998) assume a di¤erent tie-breaking rule, viz. u 0 i (0; :::; 0) = 0 for i = 1; :::; n. The BR-correspondence is the same, however.
4 Cf., e.g., Chowdhury and Sheremata (2015) and González-Sánchez and Hernández-Lerma (2016) .
where x i = x 1 + ::: + x i 1 + x i+1 + ::: + x n . Moreover,
i.e., the problem of maximizing P a (:; x i ) subject to x i 0 is strictly concave. The unique solution x i x i (x i ; a) is given by
But this is just player i's best-response function in G a . Hence, arg max
as claimed.
Consider next the case a = 0. Denote by (x) the number of nonzero entries of the vector x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ). We claim that 
is a BR-potential for G 0 . To see this, suppose …rst that x i has at least two nonzero entries.
Then, certainly (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2, so that from (8),
Moreover, u 0 i (:; x i ) is di¤erentiable, so that in straightforward extension of the case a > 0 considered above, arg max
Suppose next that x i has precisely one nonzero entry x j > 0. Then, (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = 2 if x i > 0, and (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = 1 if x i = 0. Hence, using (8) another time, P 0 (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = 8 < :
We have to show that the problem of maximizing P 0 (:; x i ) subject to x i 0 has the unique solution that is given by player i's best-response function in G 0 , i.e., by
and by x i = 0 if x j > V . From the above, it clearly su¢ ces to verify that the problem max
has an interior solution if and only if x j < V . But indeed, using (11), one can easily check that for x j > 0, lim
if and only if x j < V , as illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 . Constructing a BR-potential in the case a = 0.
Finally, suppose that all entries of x i are zero. Then, again from (8),
Discussion
Note that G a does not allow an exact potential for any a 0. Indeed, for i 6 = j,
is not symmetric with respect to i and j, as required by Monderer and Shapley's (1996) necessary condition. Along similar lines, it can be seen that the lottery contest is not a weighted potential game either.
For a V , the function u a i ( ; x i ) is strictly declining for any x i and i, and therefore, P a is actually an ordinal potential for G a . However, P a is not even a generalized ordinal potential when a < V . Indeed, for x i = " > 0 small enough, x 0 i = V a, and x i = 0,
whereas, from (3) and (8),
in con ‡ict with the de…nition. 5
Park (2015) argued that, if preferences are complete but the BR-set is empty, the BRpotential should generate the same preferences over strategies as the payo¤ function. To check this condition, note that for x i = 0,
Thus, P 0 induces a preference for lower strategies among positive strategies x i > 0, and an indi¤erence between x i = 0 and x i = n 1 n V . This is likewise true for preferences re ‡ecting player i's payo¤s when x i = 0,
Thus, P 0 satis…es Park's condition.
Proposition 1 extends to any convex combination between a purely random allocation and the lottery contest (Haavelmo, 1954; Baron, 1994) . The same is true for Amegashie's (2006) contest with minimum e¤orts.
Implications
This section presents two implications of Proposition 1.
An n-player game G will be called n 1 multilateral if for any i = 1; :::; n, there exist functions h ij : X j ! R for j 2 f1; :::; ng, such that u i (x) = P n j=1 h ij (x j ). Any zero-sum equivalent potential n-player game is necessarily equivalent to an n 1 multilateral game (Brânzei et al., 2003; Hwang and Rey-Bellet, 2017) . As the following result shows, this need not be so for a zero-sum equivalent BR-potential game.
game that is not equivalent to an n 1 multilateral game.
Proof. Recall that G 0 is strategically a zero-sum game. 6 To see that G 0 is not n 1 multilateral, note that @ n 1 u a i (x i ; x i ) @x 1 :::@x i 1 @x i+1 :::@x n = ( 1) n 1 (n 1)!
depends nontrivially on x i , which is impossible for an n 1 multilateral game.
Call a two-player game trivial if each player's BR-correspondence is constant. For n = 2, the statement of Proposition 2 may be strengthened as follows.
Corollary 1. There exists a non-trivial two-person zero-sum equivalent BR-potential game.
Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2017) have shown that, for n 3, the n-player Cournot game with linear demand, which admits an exact potential, is zero-sum equivalent. This is not true for n = 2, however, so that Corollary 1 may indeed be of interest.
